Parti Authenticité et Modernité

الطاقة والقدرة الشرائية

difficult to achieve within five years. The waiver is administratively implementable because domestic bills already use consumption bands. But the promise removes an entire bill for every eligible account while its stated levy covers only part of the cost. No independently verifiable count of eligible bills, taxable consumption above 200 kWh, or funded residual is provided; the fiscal balance and distributional effects therefore remain unresolved.

الضرائب والأجور

difficult to achieve within five years. A three-bracket schedule is legally and administratively feasible, but the proposal combines a high gross-pay exemption threshold with a sharp reduction of the top marginal rate. The current statutory schedule is based on net taxable annual income, so the proposed gross-salary thresholds cannot be mapped precisely without payroll microdata. The revenue loss is therefore uncosted, while any loss would recur every year and no durable offset is specified.

الحماية الاجتماعية والتقاعد

difficult to achieve within five years. A 3,000-MAD floor can be legislated, but applying it to every scheme from 2028 would require rapid coordination and recurring financing. The CNSS’s newer old-age pension for shorter contribution histories has a 600–1,000 MAD minimum, showing the scale of potential top-ups. Pension schemes already paid more benefits than they collected in contributions in 2024, while the civil scheme had substantial accumulated technical deficits. The number and distribution of all pensions below 3,000 MAD are not established, so the total cost cannot be reliably quantified.

الحماية الاجتماعية والتقاعد

insufficient data. The 50% rule is independently verified for the civil pension scheme and for CIMR survivor pensions, so a 100% entitlement would require substantive scheme-rule changes. In the civil scheme, the law also contains separate orphan-pension provisions, making the interaction of rights material. However, the verified evidence does not establish which compulsory schemes the party pledge covers, the number and profile of eligible widows, current survivor-pension expenditure by scheme, or a costed actuarial design. The candidate estimate of a 6–8 billion MAD annual cost cannot therefore be validated. A five-year legislative reform is conceivable, but the available evidence is insufficient to classify overall financial feasibility as either possible or hard.

الدعم الاجتماعي

difficult to achieve within five years. At the reported 3.9 million beneficiary households, a 1,000-MAD monthly floor would cost at least 46.8 billion MAD a year if all remained eligible, before administration and any supplements. That scenario exceeds the stated 2025 direct-social-assistance budget of 26.5 billion MAD by at least 20.3 billion MAD. The actual additional cost may be lower because benefits currently range from 500 to 1,350 MAD, but the distribution of payments is not published in the evidence. The target remains possible with substantial recurrent funding, fewer eligible households, or a changed benefit mix; the promise does not specify which lever closes the gap.

تشغيل الشباب

insufficient data. The numerical flow is 100,000 young people per year. The 2026 budget note confirms a 2 billion MAD Youth Employment Promotion Fund for several active programmes, including Idmaj, Tahfiz and Taehil, but it does not establish the cost or capacity of the proposed new retention-conditioned first-job contract. The party’s 50 billion MAD youth-pact figure is an overall programme claim, not a verified allocation to this measure. Without a unit subsidy, duration, expected employer take-up, definition of retention, anti-substitution rules and a dedicated appropriation, neither the candidate cost estimate nor a positive or hard overall feasibility conclusion can be verified.

سكن الشباب والحركية

achievable for a targeted scheme by 2031, but not costed at a level that can be verified. The official programme promises that the State would replace the young tenant in providing the deposit and trigger the guarantee only in default. It assigns MAD 50bn over 2027–2031 to the whole Youth Inclusion Charter, not to this fund. Morocco already administers public guarantees at much larger nominal scale through Tamwilcom and has recently processed housing support digitally at scale; neither programme is a rental-default guarantee, so their evidence supports administrative capacity rather than product readiness. A workable scheme would need formal leases, landlord enrolment, claim verification and recovery rules. Candidate A's cost estimate is not supportable: it assumes 100,000 fund users, a MAD 2,000 rent, default rates and a six-month cover that the promise does not specify. It also attributes the two-month deposit ceiling in Law 67-12 to Article 21, whereas it is in Article 20. The principal delivery risk is design and take-up, not a demonstrated impossibility within five years.

الصحة

difficult to achieve within five years. Official reporting in late 2024 identified construction projects at Beni Mellal and Errachidia and the extension of Guelmim into a CHU, giving three locations an existing project base. A government statement in October 2025 expected completion of Beni Mellal, Guelmim and Errachidia around 2027. By contrast, reporting on the Casablanca-Settat territorial health group on 10 June 2026 said its board had only endorsed the importance of launching the new Casablanca hospital-university complex. From 8 September 2026 to 31 December 2028 there are about 27.7 months. Delivering an equipped and operational Casablanca CHU inside that window, while keeping the three other projects on schedule, is difficult but the evidence does not establish a binding impossibility.

الصحة

insufficient data. The promise appears within an AMO sustainability plan but does not define what the 68% rate measures. The Ministry’s nationally comparable ENPSF-2018 reports a 21.2% caesarean rate overall, versus 62.2% in private facilities and 12.0% in public facilities. The evidence therefore does not validate 68% as a current national, AMO, private-sector, regional or facility-specific baseline. Without a current, scope-defined baseline, it is not possible to responsibly determine whether reaching 25% is possible or hard.

التشغيل والاقتصاد

difficult to achieve within five years. The target is not arithmetically impossible: Morocco created 193,000 net jobs in 2025. But it requires exceeding that result every year for five consecutive years, after only 82,000 net jobs in 2024. The 2025 gain was entirely urban in net terms; rural employment fell and agriculture lost jobs. The programme’s sectoral totals do not independently demonstrate that the claimed jobs will be net, permanent and free of double counting.

التشغيل

difficult to achieve within five years. The programme’s 10.8% reference is verified as the EMO2026 strict unemployment rate in Q1 2026; it had fallen to 9.5% in Q2 2026, with 1.121 million strictly unemployed people and a 11.764 million labour force. EMO2026 is a new survey and HCP says its results are not directly comparable with the former ENE series. At the Q2 labour-force size held constant, 7% means about 823,000 strictly unemployed people, or roughly 294,000 fewer; labour-force growth and higher participation raise the real requirement. The 200,000 annual net-job target means one million jobs over 2027–2031. That is more demanding than the government’s stated 1.45 million-jobs/9%-unemployment objective for 2030 and requires sustained performance despite material statistical and economic uncertainty.

التعليم

achievable. The promise extends an advanced national programme for children aged 4–5 rather than creating a new system. The Ministry reports 85% preschool enrolment in 2025–2026 and retains a generalization objective for the 2027–2028 school year. Delivery still depends on accelerating the remaining coverage, educator capacity and quality; enrolment coverage should not be confused with universal full-time attendance or equal service quality.

السكن وإعداد التراب

difficult to achieve within five years. The 4 billion MAD direct-grant arithmetic is manageable in isolation, and the 99,000 nationally subsidised dwellings reported for 2025 show national housing-aid throughput. But that comparator is not a count of completed rural homes. Rural delivery also requires land, local planning, dispersed construction oversight and infrastructure. The public 2026 territorial programme covered action plans for only 36 pilot centres, while 542 emerging rural centres had been identified. The national comparator therefore does not establish that 20,000 rural completions annually can be delivered.

التحول الرقمي

difficult to achieve within five years. Using the 2024 count of 9,275,038 households, 80% equals about 7.42 million households. ANRT recorded 1.127 million FTTH subscriptions at end-March 2025, up from 919,000 a year earlier. Subscriptions are not a measure of homes passed or homes connectable, so they cannot establish the exact coverage gap. Even as a favourable lower-bound proxy, however, reaching 7.42 million functioning household connections would require roughly 1.26 million additional connections a year for five years—about six times the net subscription gain recorded in the preceding year. This requires an exceptional acceleration; the party’s 100-billion-MAD multi-policy envelope does not identify a fibre allocation.

الأمازيغية والثقافة

achievable, provided the 2-billion-MAD figure is a cumulative five-year allocation. That equals 400 million MAD a year. Morocco already operates a special Treasury fund that supports public-administration modernisation, digital transition and Amazigh use; its 2025 authorised resources were 1.72 billion MAD. This demonstrates that a mechanism of this type exists and that the stated scale is fiscally conceivable, but it does not show that 400 million MAD a year is uncommitted or available solely for Amazigh projects.

الطاقة والأمن الاستراتيجي

difficult to achieve within five years. The official 2025 petroleum-products consumption figure is 12.867 million tonnes; a 90-day aggregate reserve is therefore about 3.17 million tonnes before product-by-product differences. The Court of Auditors found structural shortfalls against the existing 60-day regulatory requirement, insufficient capacity for several products and ineffective financing mechanisms. Building tanks alone would not deliver the pledge: Morocco would also need a funded, continuously held and enforceable reserve. No current audited public product-by-product inventory was found, so the additional stock gap and its cost cannot be stated reliably.

الطاقة والبيئة

difficult to achieve within five years. The wording promises 52% of electricity consumption, but the 46% baseline aligns with installed renewable capacity rather than renewable electricity delivered. Independent reporting puts renewables at 26.2% of electricity demand served in 2024, versus 45.3% of installed capacity. ONEE’s planned investment supports rapid capacity additions and storage, but it does not by itself demonstrate 52% of consumption. The metric mismatch must be corrected and the required increase in actual renewable output is substantial.

الماء والأمن المائي

difficult to achieve within five years. Officially reported annual desalination capacity was 420 million m³ in May 2026. Reaching at least 1.8 billion m³/year requires at least 1.38 billion m³/year of additional operational capacity. The government has an established expansion trajectory and a proposed Tiznit plant of up to 350 million m³/year, but its works were expected to begin only toward the end of 2027. The target is therefore not physically impossible, but it depends on the punctual completion and operation of a very large, interdependent project portfolio.

التكنولوجيا والذكاء الاصطناعي

achievable. The numerical target is modest at 1,000 instructors a year. The Education Ministry reports that 10,000 pedagogical staff were registered on its JawazTICE digital-training platform in 2024, and its January 2026 AI roadmap includes qualifying pedagogical and technical staff and developing educational programmes. These are capacity and policy signals, not proof that curriculum integration at every level will occur. The programme’s 50-billion-MAD security-pact envelope does not identify a dedicated AI allocation.